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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of the global financial crisis in 2008,1 financial regulators 
throughout the world have focused on ways to repair the economic damage and 
improve regulatory frameworks to prevent and detect future crises.2 
Fundamentally, the crisis was the result of an increasingly global financial 
system that became plagued by growing macroeconomic imbalances.3 These 
imbalances synthesized an unsustainable credit boom and a pattern of overpriced 
assets, which eventually impaired banks’ ability and willingness to extend credit, 
and ignited a free-fall in asset valuations.4 Beyond pure economics, institutional 
weaknesses in corporate governance and failed regulatory schemes have also 
been cited as significant contributors to the global financial crisis.5 
To address the immediate effects of the crisis, regulators inoculated their 
respective economies with varied monetary responses.6 The most notable and 
controversial of these rapid-fire reactions were the bailouts of financial 
institutions, particularly those that occurred in the United States.7 Similar bailouts 
and responsive measures occurred in Europe and have resulted in passionate 
debates about whether further injections should be used to cure the ongoing 
Eurozone debt crisis.8 
Looking through a long-term lens, regulators also took action to develop 
ways to prevent future crises. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act was 
 
1. The financial crisis was the culmination of economic and regulatory failures which developed over 
time, but most commentators pinpointed 2008 as the point in which its detrimental effects were felt on a large 
global scale. See Ioannis Glinavos, Regulation and the Role of Law in Economic Crisis, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 
539, 551 (2010); see also Randal D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 421 (2010); see also FIN. SERVICES AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_ 
review.pdf.  
2. Nicolas Véron, Financial Reform After the Crisis: An Early Assessment (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., 
Working Paper No. 12-2, 2012), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp12-2.pdf; Governor Daniel 
K. Tarullo, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics: 
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis (May 2, 2012). 
3. FIN. SERVICES AUTH., supra note 1, at 28. 
4. Id. 
5. Kern Alexander, Reforming European Financial Supervision and the Role of EU Institutions, AMICUS 
CURIAE, Summer 2010, available at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/2787/1/Amicus82_KernAlexander.pdf. 
6. Credit Crisis: Bailout Plan (TARP), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
subjects/c/credit_crisis/bailout_plan/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010); Guynn, supra note 1, at 434-60.  
7. Credit Crisis, supra note 6; Guynn, supra note 1, at 434-51. 
8. As of the date this Comment is being written, the Eurozone debt crisis remains a political and 
economic priority in Europe. See Michael P. Malloy, Zone Defence: The Euro Zone and the Crisis in Financial 
Services Markets, in FINANCIAL CRISIS, GLOBALISATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 9 (David A. Frenkel & 
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle eds., 2012); see also Europe Begins Working on Plan B for the Euro, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,790543,00.html; see also Greece Likely to 
Get Its Bailout, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/greece-likely-
to-get-its-bailout/2012/02/17/gIQAxqjeMR_story.html. 
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signed into law on July 21, 2010.9 Other prominent nations, including the United 
Kingdom, took on equally aggressive roles in reconsidering their regulatory 
systems.10 Indeed, the entire European Union has undergone significant financial 
reform,11 which serves as the focus of this Comment. 
While most commentators accept that the regulatory systems of leading 
economic nations failed to prevent the crisis, the approaches to avoiding future 
crises have been mixed.12 The variations in these reforms can be credited to 
contrasting assumptions about the specific causes of the crisis and divergent 
views of what objectives should be accomplished.13 Thus far, most of the post-
crisis focus has been on ensuring the health of financial institutions and 
protecting consumers, but regulators must be wary of any changes their new 
regulatory frameworks will have on the competitiveness of the financial 
markets.14 This is especially true as globalization increases and the world’s 
economies continue to collide. 
The regulatory overhaul in the European Union provides an illustrative case 
study of post-crisis financial reform. The European Union’s experience is unique 
because of its tiered structure, diverse national membership, and global economic 
importance.15 Together, its twenty-seven Member States comprise the world’s 
largest economy. 16 Thus, the success of the European financial reforms is vital to 
the goal of global economic recovery17 and will provide a prominent example of 
financial regulatory practices for the future. 
Since the inception of the crisis, the European Union has created two new 
regulatory bodies: the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”) and the 
European System of Financial Supervisors (“ESFS”).18 The ESRB is responsible 
for macro-prudential oversight of the European Union, while the ESFS is 
responsible for micro-prudential oversight.19 European Union leaders were 
convinced that one of the primary drivers of the crisis was fragmented regulation 
 
9. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html. 
10. The United Kingdom is a Member State to the European Union. Nonetheless, it continues to take 
aggressive measures to revamp its own regulatory scheme at the national level. See Eric J. Pan, Structural 
Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 796, 831-38 (2011). 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. Pan, supra note 10, at 796, 798-99. 
13. Id. at 796, 799. 
14. Id. at 796, 800. 
15. See generally Basic Information on the European Union, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
16. See How the EU Works: The Economy, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/ 
economy/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (based on GDP); Thomas A. Russo & Aaron J. Katzel, The 
2008 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath: Addressing the Next Debt Challenge 41 (Grp. of Thirty Occasional 
Paper No. 82l, 2011). 
17. Russo & Katzel, supra note 16. 
18. Eddy Wymeersch, Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 443, 448 (2011).  
19. Id. 
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within the European Union.20 Regulatory arbitrage, borne out of this fragmented 
regulatory scheme, was identified as an evil that needed to be mitigated.21 As 
such, lawmakers gave the new ESFS the power to promulgate a common 
technical rulebook for harmonized financial regulation across the European 
Union.22 
This Comment discusses the establishment of the ESFS, its rulemaking 
bodies, and how EU leaders can develop a common technical rulebook for 
financial regulation.23 The goal is to provide an analytical framework and 
suggestions for approaching the challenge of legislating this rulebook. 
To begin, Part II of this Comment discusses the financial rulemaking process 
in place prior to the recent reforms as well as the events triggering the European 
regulatory response. Part III outlines the European Union’s response to the global 
financial crisis, reviewing the seminal Jacques de Larosière Report, the 
subsequent establishment of the ESFS, and the rationale for creating the common 
technical rulebook. Part IV explores the legal basis and economic context of the 
rulebook. Lastly, Part V focuses on how the financial rules should be enacted, 
arguing that an increased use of Regulations and alternative levels of 
harmonization are key to achieving uniform regulation that will mitigate 
regulatory arbitrage within the European Union. 
II. REGULATORY INADEQUACIES AND A CALL FOR ACTION 
A.  The Lamfalussy Process and Level 3 Committees 
To better understand the changes made by the European Union, a preliminary 
review of the financial rulemaking process that existed prior to the recent reforms 
is necessary. The existing procedures—or perhaps more precisely, the existing 
bodies responsible for regulatory uniformity—were eventually deemed 
inadequate upon post-crisis evaluation by EU leaders and advisors.24 
The Lamfalussy Process,25 implemented in 2001, was erected in hopes of 
strengthening EU financial regulation26 and making the legislative process more 
 
20. See THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 27 
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf.  
21. Id. at 27. 
22. Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, at 9, COM (2009) 252 final 
(May 27, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/ 
communication_may2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf. 
23. The ESRB will not be discussed in this Comment, except to the extent it is needed to illustrate the 
broader structural landscape of the EU reforms. 
24. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 41-42. 
25. The process was the outcome of a report issued by the Committee of Wise Men, whose original task 
was to recommend changes to securities legislation. The process has since been extended to other financial 
sectors, including banking and insurance. See Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank 
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389, 
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flexible in light of rapid financial innovation.27 The process was meant to 
facilitate the enactment, interpretation, and implementation of financial 
legislation through four key levels.28 At Level 1, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union adopted the framework legislation of a given 
financial rule.29 Level 2 involved the detailing of implementation measures for 
that legislation, denominated by industry or sector. 30 Level 3 provided for the 
technical preparation of the rule’s implementation at the Member State level.31 
Finally, Level 4 consisted of the European Commission’s32 enforcement, and 
Member State transposition, of the legislated law.33 
In hopes of creating stronger EU-level rules, the primary target of the recent 
financial reforms was Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process.34 Structurally, Level 3 
preparation of Member State implementation was conducted by three EU-level 
committees: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”), the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(“CEIOPS”), and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”).35 
This group of bodies—commonly referred to as the “Level 3 Committees” or “L3 
Committees”—was comprised of representatives of national supervisory bodies.36 
The goal of the Level 3 Committees was to ensure uniform application of the 
legislated rules at the national level (i.e., among the Member States).37 
 
397 (2006). 
26. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_ 
market/single_market_services/financial_services_general_framework/l32056_en.htm (last updated June 6, 
2008).  
27. Commission Staff Working Document for the Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU Securities 
Markets Legislation, at 3, SEC (2004) 1459 (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/sec-2004-1459_en.pdf. 
28. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26. 
29. Id.; Alford, supra note 25, at 399. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
details the EU legislative process, the consent of both the Council and Parliament is required for legislative acts 
to be passed in the European Union. The Council is comprised of Member State representatives. Peter O. 
Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, Reforms of EU Banking and Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis, 
26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 187, 189 (2011). 
30. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-402. 
31. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-402. 
32. The European Commission is responsible for promoting EU harmonization by initiating new 
legislation, enforcing EU treaty obligations of Member States and individuals, and exercising certain executive 
powers. Mülbert & Wilhelm, supra note 29, at 190. 
33. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-403. 
34. As part of the treaty-based framework of the European Union, the Lamfalussy Process is subject to 
any changes in institutional and regulatory reforms that might occur within that framework. PIERRE SCHAMMO, 
EU PROSPECTUS LAW 7-8 (2011). 
35. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process: Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, at 2, COM 
(2007) 727 final (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/ 
committees/071120_final_report_en.pdf. 
36. Id.; Alford, supra note 25, at 402.  
37. Alford, supra note 25, at 402.  
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The Lamfalussy Process was aimed at minimizing regulatory arbitrage by 
providing a transparent approach that was open to input from market 
professionals, consumer bodies, and Member State regulators.38 Nonetheless, the 
process proved susceptible to inconsistencies at the Member State level because 
national regulators had the ability to add national rules to those agreed upon by 
the Level 3 Committees.39 This practice, referred to as “gold-plating,”40 weakened 
the goals of the Lamfalussy Process and provided confusion for the role of the 
Level 3 Committees.41 Also, because the membership of the Level 3 Committees 
was comprised of national supervisors, there were instances in which a 
supervisor’s duty to his nation conflicted with his duty as a member of the Level 
3 Committee. 42 As one might expect, these supervisors usually favored the 
interests of their respective Member States over those of the Union.43 
Although hailed by some as having done an impressive job in light of each 
committee’s limited personnel and budget,44 the Level 3 Committees were 
generally evaluated as having an inconsistent influence on Member State 
supervisors in performing their day-to-day supervisory duties at the national 
level.45 The crux of the criticism aimed at the committees was that they had a 
poorly-defined role in the legislative process.46 
The lack of legal power vested in the Level 3 Committees was cited as the 
root cause of these deficiencies.47 Although the decisions adopted by the Level 3 
Committees were designed to “clearly carry considerable authority,” they were 
not legally binding decisions.48 Member States could essentially override the 
decisions of the committees, undermining the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy 
Process and providing a source of regulatory fragmentation.49 With the 
development of the global financial crisis, the stage was set to reform the 
legislative process and provide EU-level lawmakers increased power to mandate 
uniform financial rules and mitigate detrimental practices like gold-plating. 
 
38. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5; Alford, supra note 25, at 402.  
39. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 5, 9. 
42. Id. at 7. 
43. Id. 
44. KAREL LANNOO, CEPS POLICY BRIEF, NO. 241, THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A 
MID-TERM REVIEW 2 (2011), available at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/5500/pdf. 
45. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5. 
46. See Commission Staff Working Document for the Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU 
Securities Markets Legislation, supra note 27, at 10. 
47. See Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 9. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 5, 9. 
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B.  A Call for Action in the European Union 
The effects of the subprime mortgage crisis that began in the United States 
spread quickly around the world—the European Union and its Member States 
were not spared.50 Mirroring the events in the United States, a credit crunch soon 
developed in Europe.51 Relaxed borrowing standards in European countries were 
fueling higher property valuations, while national regulators ignored concerns 
about the dangerous increases in debt.52 When prices of the underlying assets 
began to fall, European banks were confronted with liquidity problems, which for 
some, grew into larger solvency problems.53 A domino effect resulted where 
credit became leaner and increased austerity measures were implemented, both of 
which furthered the economic slowdown.54 
By late October 2008, a call for action from the public and European 
Parliament was heard by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, 
who appointed a panel of experts headed by Jacques de Larosière to articulate a 
plan that would address the shortcomings of EU financial regulation.55 In 
November 2010, the European Union answered the call by adopting a new 
regulatory structure based on the de Larosière Group’s findings.56 
III. CALL ANSWERED: THE DE LAROSIÈRE REPORT AND FINANCIAL REFORM 
A.  The de Larosière Report 
In response to the financial crisis and subsequent calls for action, European 
Commission President Josè Manuel Barroso recognized the need for an 
 
50. The more technical nuances of the economic factors leading up to the crisis are outside the scope of 
this Comment. For a thorough discussion of the developments leading up to the crisis, with specific implications 
for the European Union, see Anu Arora, The 2007-09 Banking Crisis and the EU’s Regulatory Response, 21 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 603 (2010). 
51. Russo & Katzel, supra note 16. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 42. 
54. Id. 
55. EU Panel on Banking Supervision Raises Concerns, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 23, 2008), 
http://www.euractiv.com/financial-services/eu-panel-banking-supervision-raises-concerns/article-176600. 
56. Parliament Gives Green Light to New Financial Supervision Structure, EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS 
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/headlines/content/20100910FCS81938/012/html/ 
Parliament-gives-green-light-to-new-financial-supervision-architecture; Press Release, Council of the Eur. 
Union, Financial Supervision: Council Adopts Legal Texts Establishing the European Systemic Risk Board and 
Three New Supervisory Authorities (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/117747.pdf; Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:0047:EN:PDF 
(establishing the EBA); Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0048:0083:EN:PDF (establishing the EIOCPA); 
Council Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0084:0119:EN:PDF (establishing the ESMA). 
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independent review of financial regulation within the European Union.57 In late 
October 2008, Barroso asked Jacques de Larosière to head a High Level Group 
(“Group”) of financial experts to report findings and recommendations on ways 
to improve financial supervision in Europe.58 In the resulting de Larosière Report 
(“Report”), released on February 25, 2009, the Group made thirty-one specific 
recommendations to the European Commission.59 Among the advice given, the 
Group urged Member States and the European Parliament to avoid regulatory 
inconsistencies and harmonize a set of core financial rules.60 Additionally, the 
Group envisioned a European System of Financial Supervisors that would be 
responsible for implementing this set of financial rules.61 
Although it recognized that the majority of the regulatory issues encountered 
were candidates for broader international responses, the de Larosière Group 
identified the “lack of a consistent set of rules” as an issue of particular 
importance to the European Union.62 According to the Report, the structure of the 
European Union, comprised of a single financial market supervised by various 
levels of rulemakers, exposed European financial regulation to inconsistencies.63 
The Group advised that while EU-level rules should certainly provide a set of 
“minimum core standards” for harmonization, Member States should be allowed 
to adopt stricter standards when deemed domestically appropriate by each 
Member States’ national supervisors.64 Although a minimum set of standards was 
 
57. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, High Level Expert Group on EU Financial Supervision to 
Hold First Meeting on 12 November (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1679. 
58. Id.; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 3; Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The 
Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57, 
80 (2010). 
59. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20. 
60. Id. at 29. The Group observed a need to “tackle the current absence of a truly harmonised set of core 
rules in the EU,” and it recommend that: 
Member States and the European Parliament should avoid in the future legislation that permits 
inconsistent transposition and application; [and] the Commission and the [L]evel 3 Committees 
should identify those national exceptions, the removal of which would improve the functioning 
of the single financial market; reduce distortions of competition and regulatory arbitrage; or 
improve the efficiency of cross-border financial activity in the EU. Notwithstanding, a Member 
State should be able to adopt more stringent national regulatory measures considered to be 
domestically appropriate for safeguarding financial stability as long as the principles of the 
internal market and agreed minimum core standards are respected.  
Id. (Recommendation 10). The de Larosiere report was by no means the first time the concept of regulatory 
harmonization was recommended. The concept has been discussed for some time, and the Lamfalussy Process 
was a first attempt at harmonization. See Thomas M.J. Moolers, Sources of Law in European Securities 
Regulation—Effective Regulation, Soft Law and Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to de Larosiere, 11 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 381 (2010). 
61. Id. at 48, 51, 53, 56.  
62. Id. at 27.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 28, 29.  
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encouraged, complete consistency among all Member States was not identified as 
an ultimate end.65 
The de Larosière Group also recommended that EU officials create the 
European System of Financial Supervisors to control micro-prudential 
supervision of the Single Market66 and promulgate the common rulebook.67 As 
proposed, the ESFS would be a network of three new EU-level authorities 
combined with the college of supervisors (an existing system of Member State 
supervisors that maintained a consultative role in the Lamfalussy Process).68 
Because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the Level 3 Committees, the Group 
recommended that the three new authorities be vested with authority broader than 
the Level 3 Committees as they then existed.69 In the Report, the three authorities 
were visualized as “enhanced [L]evel 3 [C]ommittees.”70 
B.  Creation of the European System of Financial Supervisors 
The European Commission welcomed the de Larosière Report, taking 
ambitious steps towards implementing many of the de Larosière Group’s 
recommendations, including the establishment of the ESFS.71 Decisively, the 
Commission drafted a package of legislative proposals based on the Report by 
September 2009.72 A year later, in November 2010, the European Parliament and 
 
65. Id.  
66. Micro-prudential supervision consists primarily of supervision of financial institutions. Alford, supra 
note 58, at 68. Examples of micro-prudential regulation include “certification of those working in the financial 
sector; rules on what assets can be held by whom; how instruments are listed, traded, sold and reported; and 
measures of the value and riskiness of assets.” THE WARWICK COMM’N, THE WARWICK COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM: IN PRAISE OF UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELDS 12 (2009), available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/financialreform/report/; see also Pablo Iglesias 
Rodriguez, Towards a New European Financial Architecture, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2009). See 
infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of the Single Market. 
67. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 48. In Recommendation 18 of the Report, the Group 
recommended that the ESFS be set up as a decentralized network, comprised of three groups with distinct roles: 
- existing national supervisors would continue to carry-out day-to-day supervision; 
- three new European Authorities would be set up, replacing CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR, 
with the role coordinate the application of supervisory standards and guarantee strong 
cooperation between the national supervisors; 
- colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border institutions. 
Id.  
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 41, 42. 
70. Id. at 47. 
71. Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving European Recovery, at 6, 7, COM (2009) 
114 final (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 
2009:0114:FIN:EN:PDF. 
72. Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European 
Banking Authority, COM (2009) 501 final (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_501_en.pdf (proposing establishment of the 
EBA); Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
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Council approved the financial supervision package, with the ESFS to begin its 
work on January 1, 2011.73 
In its final form, the ESFS was established as a network of three bodies: (1) a 
set of three financial supervisors at the EU level, known as the European 
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”); (2) a Joint Committee to steer the efforts of 
the ESAs; and (3) a network of national supervisors responsible for day-to-day 
supervision at the Member State level, subject to oversight by the ESAs.74 Broken 
down further, the ESAs consist of a European Banking Authority (“EBA”), based 
in London, England; a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(“EIOPA”), based in Frankfurt, Germany; and a European Securities and Markets 
Authority (“ESMA”), based in Paris, France.75 
In contrast to the Level 3 Committees, the Commission envisioned the ESAs 
as authorities with legal personalities having additional power and 
responsibilities.76 Specifically, the new ESAs have responsibility for both 
regulatory and supervisory functions—the regulatory function primarily refers to 
rulemaking, while the supervisory function refers to application of the rules.77 
Under their regulatory power, the ESAs are responsible for developing binding 
technical standards and providing interpretative guidelines to assist Member 
State authorities in applying such rules.78 This means that the ESAs, as part of the 
ESFS, have the legal authority to promulgate a common technical rulebook for 
financial regulation throughout the European Union.79 
  
 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_502_en.pdf 
(proposing establishment of the EIOPA); Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_ 
503_en.pdf (proposing establishment of the ESMA). 
73. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union supra note 56; Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, 
supra note 57; Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56; 
Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56. 
74. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22, at 8. 
75. Id.; Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56; 
Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56. 
76. Alford, supra note 58, at 68. 
77. A third, institutional function has been identified. This refers to the coordinated efforts of the ESRB 
and ESFS in preventing and managing financial risk in the European Union. While relevant to the success of the 
EU financial reforms, this function is beyond the scope of this Comment. LANNOO, supra note 44; Wymeersch, 
supra note 18, at 2; Nicolette Kost de Sevres & Lorenzo Sasso, The New European Financial Markets Legal 
Framework: A Real Improvement?, 7 CAP. MARKETS L. J., 30, 37 (2011).  
78. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22. 
79. LANNOO, supra note 44, at 2; see also infra Part IV. 
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C.  An Introduction to the Common Technical Rulebook 
In recommending the common technical rulebook, the de Larosière Group 
identified four reasons for having a harmonized set of financial rules.80 First, the 
Group noted that the Single Market of the European Union, by nature, requires a 
consistent set of rules in order to function properly.81 Second, it was concerned 
that competition within the European Union would suffer if there were 
inconsistent financial regulations among the Member States—the Group was 
worried about the opportunity for institutions to practice regulatory arbitrage 
through gold-plating.82 Third, the Group observed that a fragmented regulatory 
environment presented magnified efficiency, risk management, and capital 
allocation problems for cross-border institutions.83 Fourth, crisis management, 
especially for cross-border institutions, was deemed more difficult in a regulatory 
environment lacking consistent standards.84 By recommending the 
implementation of a common technical rulebook, the Group was optimistic that 
these issues could be resolved.85 
The European Commission agreed, finding the Group’s suggestion to 
develop a set of harmonized rules “of particular interest.”86 Beyond the four 
rationales identified by the de Larosière Group, the Commission noted additional 
benefits to a common technical rulebook at the EU level, including strengthened 
stability, equal treatment, and lower compliance costs.87 The Commission 
premised the ability of the ESAs to establish a common rulebook on “principles 
of partnership, flexibility and subsidiarity.”88 
IV. THE COMMON TECHNICAL RULEBOOK: ECONOMIC AND  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The development of the common technical rulebook is limited by the 
economic and legal setting of the European Union. Economically, regulators 
must be wary of the impacts their legislation will have on both the international 
 





85. See id. 
86. Communication for the Spring European Council, supra note 71, at 5. 
87. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Services: Additional Legislative Proposal to 
Complete the Framework for Fin. Supervision in Eur. 2 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-49_en.pdf. Uniform laws help reduce transaction costs, especially in a diverse situation such has 
the European Union. For a sound discussion on the economic role of uniform laws, see John Linarelli, The 
Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1387 (2003). 
88. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Services: Commission Proposes Stronger 
Financial Supervision in Europe (May 27, 2009), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-836_en.pdf. 
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markets and the European Union’s Single Market.89 Legally, lawmakers must act 
within their affirmatively granted power and abide by the broader treaty-based 
principles that permeate throughout the EU legal system.90 This Part discusses 
how these factors combine to provide the legal basis for enactment of the 
financial rules in the common technical rulebook. 
A.  International and Single Market Implications 
While most of the attention in developing the common rulebook will focus 
on the European Union and its Member States, regulators must also be aware of 
any international implications. Every piece of legislation enacted by the ESAs 
will have effects felt beyond the borders of the European Union, either directly or 
indirectly. This is a natural consequence of the increasingly global economy.91 
Likewise, the links between the international community and the European 
Union will have reciprocal implications within the European Union itself.92 The 
European Union, as a representative of its twenty-seven Member States, is 
heavily involved in a number of international economic forums—most notably, 
the Basel Accords, G-20 Summits, and the International Monetary Fund.93 In this 
context, the de Larosière Group stressed that the European Union should “speak 
with one voice.”94 Because of the impacts that each of these external 
commitments will have on the European Union’s relationship with its Member 
States, EU leaders must be careful not to blur its goals as a Single Market regime 
with those it has as a global economic participant. 
Within the European Union, any rules adopted under the common rulebook 
must be consistent with the policies of the European Union’s Single Market.95 
 
89. See infra Part IV.A.  
90. See infra Part IV.B. 
91. See Herman Van Rompuy, Foreword to THE LESSONS OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS THAT SHOULD 
SHAPE THE EU’S G20 STANCE, FRIENDS OF EUROPE (2011), available at www.friendsofeurope.org/ 
Portals/13/Events/Roundtables/2011/Taming_the_turmoil/Lessons_of_Eurozone_Crisis_that_Should_Shape_th
e_EU%27s_G20_Stance.pdf (noting that “[t]he destinies of the world’s main economies are more intertwined 
than ever before.”). 
92. This applies with equal force to the European Union as a whole as well as Member States in their 
individual capacity as players in the world economy. See Rodriguez, supra note 66 at 5-6. 
93. See Organisation and Governance, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/about/ 
orggov.htm (last updated December 19, 2011) (noting that members are central banks or monetary authorities, 
including the European Central Bank); see Relations with the IMF, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
economy_finance/international/forums/imf/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (clarifying that while 
“only [individual countries] are members of the IMF, the European Union is represented therein by its Member 
States.”); see About G20 Member Countries, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/infographics/20121201/ 
780989503.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (indicating the European Union as a member). 
94. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 29. 
95. This principle is legally mandated by Article 114 of the TFEU. Communication from the Commission, 
supra note 22, at 14. 
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The Single Market, also referred to as the Internal Market,96 represents the efforts 
of the European Union and its twenty-seven Member States to promote the “four 
freedoms”: the free circulation of people, goods, services, and capital.97 As 
described under the EU treaties, the policies served by the Single Market include 
promoting sustainable economic growth and competition, ensuring social 
progress, and fostering cohesion among the Member States.98 Accordingly, the 
Regulations that created the ESFS provide that any actions taken by the ESAs, 
including the promulgation of the common rulebook, must be done in the context 
of the Single Market as a whole.99 
B.  Legal Authority to Create the Common Technical Rulebook 
The European Union’s source of power for creating the ESFS and the ESAs 
was derived from Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”).100 Under Article 114, EU lawmakers can adopt measures that 
allow for the creation of a “[c]ommunity body responsible for contributing to the 
implementation of a process of harmonisation,” so long as that body’s 
responsibilities are closely linked to the functioning of the Single Market.101 
Because one of the responsibilities of the ESAs will be to develop a common 
rulebook for uniform application of financial rules within the Single Market of 
 
96. A distinction may be framed by narrowly defining the Single Market as having purely economic 
implications, while characterizing the Internal Market as one with both economic and social implications. 
Paulina Dejmek, The EU Internal Market for Financial Services: A Look at the First Regulatory Responses to 
the Financial Crisis and a View to the Future, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 455, 456 (2009). For the purposes of this 
Comment, this distinction will be ignored, although the social implications of any financial rule will surely be 
considered by EU lawmakers when creating the common rulebook.  
97. General Policy Framework, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index 
_1_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2011). 
98. Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union art. 3, Mar. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 83) 15, 
available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF. 
99. Paragraph 11 of each Regulation Preamble provides: 
The Authority should act with a view to improving the functioning of the internal market, in 
particular by ensuring a high, effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision 
taking account of the varying interests of all Member States and the different nature of 
financial institutions. The Authority should protect public values such as the stability of the 
financial system, the transparency of markets and financial products, and the protection of 
depositors and investors. The Authority should also prevent regulatory arbitrage and guarantee 
a level playing field, and strengthen international supervisory coordination, for the benefit of 
the economy at large, including financial institutions and other stakeholders, consumers and 
employees.  
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56; Council 
Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 41, 42. 
100. Article 114 of the TFEU superseded Article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(“EC Treaty”). Kost de Sevres & Sasso, supra note 77. For a timeline of the relevant EU treaties, see Mülbert & 
Wilhelm, supra note 29; EU Treaties, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-
making/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
101. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22, at 14. 
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the European Union, this required nexus was satisfied when the ESFS was 
established.102 
Under the Regulations establishing the ESAs, the power of the ESAs to issue 
binding law is limited to defining technical standards related to the functioning of 
the Single Market.103 The Regulations further note that the adopted rules “shall 
not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and their content shall be 
delimited by the legislative acts on which they are based.”104 In other words, the 
laws provided under the common rulebook will be construed strictly as technical 
rules rather than policy-laden standards applicable in a broader context. 
In addition to legislating binding technical law, the ESAs may also issue 
“guidelines and recommendations addressed to competent authorities or financial 
institutions” to assist with implementation of the technical rules enacted.105 These 
guidelines and recommendations will have no force of law, but will promote 
coherent implementation of the common rules at the Member State level, 
contributing to the goal of harmonization.106 
The technical standards adopted by the ESAs may be drafted by any one of 
the three authorities and submitted to the Commission for endorsement.107 Upon 
review of the draft, the European Commission will take action in one of three 
ways: (1) forward the legislation to the European Parliament and the Council for 
review and ultimate adoption; (2) ask the drafting ESA to amend the draft and 
resubmit an updated version to the Commission; or (3) choose not to endorse the 
draft in its entirety.108 In cases where the drafted legislation is severable, the 
Commission may endorse, amend, or reject the ESA’s draft in part.109 
C.  Legislative Toolbox: Directives and Regulations 
EU lawmakers have a flexible regulatory system in which to effectuate 
harmonized laws within the European Union. In resolving the question of how to 
 
102. Id. 
103. See Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; see also Council Regulation 
1094/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; see also Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; LANNOO, 
supra note 44. This principle is consistent with the treaty-based limitations placed on all EU financial 
legislation. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 114, May 9, 
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. 
104. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 
56, at art. 10; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10. 
105. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 16; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 
56, at art. 16; Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 16. 
106. LANNOO, supra note 44. 
107. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15. 
108. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15. 
109. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15. 
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enact the common technical rulebook, EU lawmakers have two primary tools for 
enacting binding law: Directives and Regulations.110 
Directives, founded in a principles-based approach,111 constitute EU law that 
require certain end goals, but allow Member States to choose how to adapt their 
laws to meet those goals.112 The process of implementation at the national level is 
known as “transposition.”113 According to the European Commission, “Directives 
are used to bring different national laws into line with each other, and are 
particularly common in matters affecting the operation of the [S]ingle 
[M]arket.”114 Thus, Directives have historically been considered a valuable tool in 
approaching financial legislation.115 
As a separate instrument for EU lawmakers, Regulations constitute 
immediately binding law with legal force equivalent to each Member States’ own 
laws.116 Regulations are examples of rules-based regulations, which tend to 
provide predictability, but less discretion than principles-based regulations such 
as Directives.117 Unlike Directives, Regulations become effective without further 
action by the Member States.118 In other words, Regulations are immediately and 
directly applicable throughout the European Union—there is no transposition 
process.119 
In contemplating legislation for the common technical rulebook, EU 
lawmakers must decide whether to enact financial rules as Directives or 
Regulations. A rule-by-rule approach is the necessary course, but, as will be 
discussed in the following Part, lawmakers should consider an increased use of 
Regulations to effectuate their goal of EU-wide harmonization. 
  
 
110. What Is EU Law?, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/treaty_en.htm (last 
updated June 25, 2011). 
111. Principles-based regulation is based on the communication of certain goals and expectations between 
regulatory parties, as opposed to relationships in which one party directs or controls the other. Glinavos, supra 
note 1. 
112. What Are EU Directives?, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_ 
directive_en.htm (last updated June 25, 2011); Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities 
Law After the Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J.L BUS. & FIN. 43, 48 (2008). 
113. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112. 
114. Id. 
115. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 
10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 61 (2003). 
116. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112.  
117. Glinavos, supra note 1. 
118. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112. 
119. LANNOO, supra note 44. 
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V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING THE COMMON  
TECHNICAL RULEBOOK 
In defining a set of harmonized technical rules to prevent and detect future 
financial crises, EU lawmakers have a complex task that will require a 
coordinated and flexible approach.120 As discussed below, much of this task 
includes balancing competing interests and ideas. This Part examines these issues 
and develops two primary recommendations on how the common technical 
rulebook should be enacted. First, lawmakers should consider varied levels of 
harmonization to provide a flexible approach to the rulebook. Second, a wider 
use of Regulations, rather than Directives, should be considered in pursuit of 
regulatory uniformity and harmonization. For completeness, threshold 
considerations of legislative subject matter and regulatory responsibility are 
discussed first. 
A.  Threshold Issues: What Should Be Regulated and Who Should Regulate 
EU lawmakers face a dynamic challenge in deciding what and whether to 
regulate certain financial subject matter. Due to the rapid proliferation of 
complex financial instruments and transactions throughout the world, there is an 
increasingly large pool of financial subject matter that has avoided regulation 
altogether.121 At the same time, existing subject matter may have transformed or 
become obsolete.122 Thus, the first issue in enacting any financial rule is deciding 
whether the subject matter is ripe for legislation—or, where regulations already 
exist, deciding whether those rules remain well-suited for that particular subject 
matter.123 
Practically, the issue will often be resolved by the obvious premise that the 
need for regulation presupposes an existing concern over potential or past 
financial risk.124 In other words, the topics will present themselves.125 Because 
legislation is often a response mechanism to an identified event or crisis, 
lawmakers usually concern themselves with resolving issues already past.126 This 
was the case with the recent financial reforms and will continue to be the case 
 
120. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, supra note 88. 
121. See Alexandra Hennessy, Redesigning Financial Supervision in the European Union 7 (Mar. 3, 
2011) (paper prepared for presentation), available at http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/12d_hennessy.pdf 
(discussing the difficulty in financial lawmaking due to “continuously evolving [financial markets] as a result of 
innovation and international integration”). 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See generally Pan, supra note 10, at 813. 
125. See generally id. 
126. Id. 
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going forward.127 At the same time, lawmakers must be careful not to fall prey to 
hasty judgment—it is easy to react impulsively to a crisis while either ignoring 
future events or overcompensating for the crisis in a way detrimental to future 
developments.128 As such, the standards adopted under the common technical 
rulebook should address current issues, but also be agile enough to address future 
risks and perpetually new financial subject matter.129 
The question of who should regulate focuses on the choice between 
establishing a financial rule at the EU level or the Member State level.130 While 
the ESAs may have the legal authority to legislate a certain financial rule at the 
EU level, other practical or prudential considerations may deter them from doing 
so. As would be expected, these considerations are susceptible to divergent 
theories about degrees of regulatory centralization and the practice of legislative 
federalism, providing a possible source of conflict between EU authorities and 
individual Member States.131 
A logical maxim of financial regulation states that “the structure of [a] 
regulatory system needs to reflect the structure of the markets that are 
regulated.”132 This principle, which speaks to degrees of regulatory centralization, 
becomes harder to apply when there is a multilayered system of regulatory 
authorities, such as in the case the European Union.133 
Historically, there exist two contrasting views with respect to what degree of 
regulatory centralization is needed in the European Union.134 The first view, 
generally favored by the more affluent Member States such as the United 
 
127. While there was certainly a European call for responsive reform, a broader channel for change was 
submitted under the G-20 summits. In the European Union, the establishment of the ESRB and the ESFS have 
been movements of reform beyond the framework developed at the G-20 summits. Alford, supra note 58, at 60. 
128. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39 (2009) 
(discussing the issue primarily in the context of U.S. financial reforms). 
129. See Hennessy, supra note 121, at 28. 
130. EU-level legislation preempts Member State law to the extent there is a conflict. The concept of 
shared competence, derived from the principle of conferral, implies that Member States may take action so long 
as EU-level regulators have not exercised their competence to legislate. This concept affects the extent to which 
subject matter can be regulated at the EU level (or, in the negative, the extent to which Member States cannot 
regulate certain subject matter). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, supra note 98, at art. 
5; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 2; Dejmek, supra note 96, at 457. Broadly speaking, this 
concept is similar to the concept of concurrent jurisdiction between state courts and federal courts in the U.S. 
judicial system.  
131. See, e.g., Written Evidence From the British Bankers’ Association, U.K. PARLIAMENT: EUR. 
SCRUTINY COMM. (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 201012/cmselect/ 
cmeuleg/1817/1817vw04.htm (questioning whether there is a need for “more or less Europe” in U.K. bank 
regulation). 
132. Lastra, supra note 115, at 51 (citing Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, Issues in the Unification 
of Financial Sector Supervision, International Money Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, (IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/00/213, 2000). 
133. See id. 
134. Id. at 55. 
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Kingdom, is premised on achieving harmonization through greater cooperation 
between national authorities, competitive pressures, and self-regulation.135 This 
view supports a decentralized structure and would put more legislative power in 
Member State authorities.136 Sitting on the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
second view promotes a centralized architecture, with more regulatory power 
vested in the primary federal body rather than national authorities.137 
Before the de Larosière Report and the creation of the ESRB and ESFS, the 
concept of a single regulatory authority at the EU level had been discussed for 
some time.138 Critics of a single-supervisor system feared that regulatory 
centralization would provide an excessive concentration of power and lack of 
accountability, overriding the basic premises of federalism.139 
As recommended by the de Larosière Group and enacted by EU leaders, the 
formulation of the ESRB and ESFS appears to effectuate a middle ground by 
forming a hybrid approach. In particular, the structure of the ESFS allows for 
centralized rulemaking at the EU level through the common rulebook, while 
mitigating dangers of regulatory abuse by allowing the existing college of 
supervisors to handle day-to-day supervision at the national level.140 Thus, the 
ESAs have been dubbed “embryonic federal supervisory authorities,” whose 
success will depend on both their internal management and their cooperation 
with national supervisors.141 
With this coordinated approach in mind, the relevance of supervision to the 
analysis of the common rulebook becomes apparent: the structure adopted by the 
European Union provides a formula in which rules and supervision appear to 
have an inverse relationship.142 Where the details of EU-level rules are less 
comprehensive, the ESAs may demand stricter supervision at the national level.143 
Conversely, where EU-level rules are technically robust, less Member State 
supervision is warranted.144 
This regulation-supervision dichotomy sheds light on how EU lawmakers 
can juggle the difficult balancing act they face in creating the common technical 
rulebook. The ESAs are to abstain from engaging in the “Europeanisation” of all 





138. See generally id. 
139. Id. at 52. 
140. See supra Part III. 
141. LANNOO, supra note 44, at 2. 
142. See generally Hennessy, supra note 121. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Supervision—Frequently Asked Questions 4 
(May 27, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/251 
&type=HTML. 
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the Single Market through uniform financial regulation.146 If the ESAs yield to 
Member States by providing for less obtrusive financial rules at the EU level, 
they should require a higher level of EU-level supervision, and vice versa. In this 
light, the success of the common rulebook will depend on how lawmakers go 
about enacting EU-wide financial rules. 
B.  How the Rules Should Be Enacted: Toward a Broader Use of Regulations 
and Alternative Degrees of Harmonization 
Although EU lawmakers must abide by the legal and economic backdrop of 
the European Union, they now have increased power and flexibility to regulate 
the Single Market in a uniform manner.147 This Section explores how EU leaders 
can fine-tune financial rules through an increased use of Regulations and varying 
degrees of harmonization. The goal is to account for the regulatory flexibility 
demanded by the unique nature of the European Union, while at the same time 
achieving the level of harmonization envisioned by the de Larosière Group and 
the European Commission in recommending the common technical rulebook.148 
Prior to the recent financial crisis, Directives were the preferred method for 
achieving financial integration within the European Union.149 In the eyes of 
lawmakers, the flexibility of Directives facilitated a framework that respected 
and integrated Member States’ legal and cultural traditions.150 Additionally, 
Directives were consistent with the desired principles of minimum harmonization 
and mutual recognition.151 On the other hand, Regulations were used sparingly 
because they were tailored toward the principle of full or detailed harmonization, 
leaving little room for adaptive integration by national supervisors.152 
Undoubtedly, the use of Directives is less encroaching on Member States as 
individual sovereigns.153 But in using Directives to provide minimum standards, 
there is an increased exposure to the formation of divergent national regimes,154 
making it difficult for EU-level regulators to assess and enforce the 
implementation of harmonized laws.155 As expressed by the de Larosière Report, 
 
146. Id. at 5. 
147. See supra Part IV. 
148. See supra Part III. 
149. Lastra, supra note 115, at 61. 
150. Dejmek, supra note 96, at 459. 
151. See Lastra, supra note 115, at 61. 
152. See generally id. Of course, Member State voices were heard during the initial legislative process, 
with national authorities playing important consultative roles. FIN. SERVICES AUTH., supra note 1, at 100. This 
representation remains alive and well, as the college of supervisors is one of the foundational pillars of the 
ESFS. See supra Part III.A. 
153. See Dejmek, supra note 96, at 459. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
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one of the primary goals of the financial reforms was to mitigate this type of 
exposure and ease the implementation of uniform law.156 
Strangely, the de Larosière Group pointed out that in promulgating the 
common rulebook, the ESAs should provide a minimum set of harmonized rules, 
allowing Member States to add stricter rules at the national level.157 A narrow 
reading of this recommendation would seem to add little to what was already 
being achieved through the use of Directives.158 Permitting Member States to 
adopt stricter rules within their respective sovereigns would perpetuate the 
existence of regulatory arbitrage, an evil which both the de Larosière Group and 
the European Commission identified as a source of financial risk within the 
European Union.159 
Instead of maintaining strict adherence to the concept of minimum 
harmonization, EU lawmakers should also consider the concepts of maximum 
harmonization or a range of harmonization. These alternative degrees of 
harmonization will allow for flexibility depending on what is being regulated 
while ensuring the ultimate goal of uniform regulation. 
Maximum harmonization requires that Member States adopt the rule at face 
value, without the option to impose stricter rules.160 Such harmonization should 
be used where the interest in maintaining strict uniformity outweighs Member 
States’ interests in having regulatory choices and the ability to fine-tune EU-wide 
rules.161 In other words, where a regulatory approach is unanimously agreed-upon 
at the EU and Member State levels, maximum harmonization should be 
implemented.162 Of course, rules enacted with maximum harmonization must be 
tailored with the utmost detail to prevent any deviation and gold-plating. 
As an additional alternative, using a range of harmonization provides 
flexibility through the use of one of two methods: mandated flexibility based on 
state-by-state fluctuations,163 or options between multiple but mandatory rules.164 
While use of ranges provides the most flexibility, it is susceptible to the same 
evils as minimum harmonization—namely, regulatory arbitrage due to 
inconsistencies or loopholes. The diverse nature of the constituent Member States 
that make up the European Union will likely force the frequent use of 
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harmonization ranges in pursuit of EU-wide regulatory uniformity. Nonetheless, 
any such use should minimize the amount of discretion given to national 
regulators by allowing fluctuations based on objective measures.165 
The choice between enacting rules as Regulations or Directives goes hand-
in-hand with the choice among levels of harmonization. A principles-based 
solution to mitigating regulatory arbitrage, which could be achieved through 
Directives, would be to improve cooperation among the national regulators to 
minimize the differences in laws.166 When considering the role of national 
supervisors in the structure of the ESFS, the European Commission expressed its 
hope that it had indeed provided this solution.167 It envisioned that national 
supervisors would take an institution-wide view regarding supervision, rather 
than views favorable to their respective nations.168 Although this is a laudable 
solution, it is meaningless without a strict rule-based regulation to fall back on.169 
This is why the Lamfalussy Process failed; there was no hard-law mechanism for 
EU-level regulators to ensure uniformity among the Member States.170 
Under the new hybrid approach of the ESFS, discussed above, the regulation-
supervision dichotomy requires that if Member States are given more supervisory 
latitude, then stricter technical rules should be in place as a check on this 
power.171 To this end, EU lawmakers should not only go outside the box and 
consider varying levels of harmonization, but they should also enact rules in the 
form of Regulations to ensure the desired level of uniformity is precisely tuned. 
Of course, the ESAs must be conscious of the balance between ensuring a 
sound regulatory scheme while still fostering competition and growth.172 In 
recommending an increased use of Regulations, the primary risk is that of 
possible over-regulation, which may burden Member States and their constituents 
by preventing cross-border institutions from doing business in a cost-effective 
manner.173 Such over-regulation would also sacrifice the ideals of the Single 
Market. 
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While these concerns implicate the dispute over what degree of centralization 
is necessary, Member States worried about over-regulation may be appeased by 
keeping in mind two legal limitations on the ESAs’ ability to legislate financial 
regulation. First, the common rulebook is limited to only technical financial 
rules.174 Second, the treaty-based principle of proportionality limits lawmakers by 
requiring that their acts not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of Article 114 of the TFEU.175 For the purposes of enacting the common 
rulebook, the regulatory objectives are defined by the Single Market concept.176 
Together, these limitations mean that the financial regulations enacted must be 
purely technical and narrowly tailored to support the Single Market.177 
Considering these checks on the power of the ESAs, it is clear that any financial 
legislation considered at the EU level will be heavily scrutinized before being 
added to the common technical rulebook.178 
Regardless of one’s view on the appropriate degree of regulatory 
centralization, the bargain in a harmonized regime like the European Union is 
that Member States forego their ability to maintain independent requirements, 
while each nation reaps benefits from the broader impacts of the Single Market—
namely, enhancement of freedoms of movement and establishment among the 
entire European Union.179 The ultimate goal is a healthy Single Market, and 
uniformity in certain areas of financial regulation is required to meet that end.180 
Through a broader use of Regulations, EU-level authorities will take pressure off 
their national counterparts, allowing Member States to concentrate on their local 
markets with the knowledge that there is a level playing field across the 
European Union. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The financial reforms in the European Union provide a useful model for 
discussing forward-looking practices of financial rulemaking.181 Because other 
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global financial reforms are still in their early stages, many regulators and 
institutions are eagerly watching how the European Union handles its new 
financial rulemaking duties.182 The role of the ESFS, and in particular the ESAs, 
in promulgating a common technical rulebook within the European Union may 
ultimately prove to be a grand experiment in demonstrating whether the concept 
of a Single Market is actually sustainable.183 Regardless, EU leaders have 
recognized regulatory arbitrage as a present-day evil that should be combatted 
through harmonized financial regulation.184 
Within the European Union, the availability of regulatory subsidies that vary 
from nation to nation provides enterprising institutions opportunities to practice 
regulatory arbitrage.185 The narrow risk is that such practices may undermine 
regional stability in the European Union, while the larger threat is that there are 
areas that remain susceptible to regulatory arbitrage at a global scale.186 In 
enacting the common technical rulebook, EU leaders will attempt to mitigate 
regulatory arbitrage while minimizing hindrances to market competition among 
its Member States. To this end, EU lawmakers should consider varying degrees 
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